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“There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has.”
- United States Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black1

I. Introduction – The Background Story
The legal saga started exactly eight years earlier, in June 2003, when a
South Carolina family court judge ordered Michael Turner to pay $51.73 a
week to Rebecca Rogers to help support their child.2 During the following
three years, Turner was held in contempt five different times for failure to
pay the support payment;3 “the first four times he was sentenced to ninety
days’ imprisonment but he ultimately paid the amount due.”4
The fifth time he completed a six-month sentence, after which the
court clerk issued a “show cause” order to him on March 27, 2006.5 After
the original hearing for this order was rescheduled because of Turner’s
failure to appear came the hearing specifically under review in the case at
hand.6 There, the court clerk told Turner that he was $5,728.76 behind in
child support payment, and the judge then asked Turner if he had anything
to say.7 To this, Turner explained that he had missed prior payments
because of drugs and an injury, but that he was now sober and sorry about

1. Peter Edelman, When Second Best Is the Best We Can Do: Improving the Odds for
Pro Se Civil Litigants, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 9 (June 2011), http://www.
americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/06/pdf/secondbest.pdf.
2. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2011) (revealing how the family’s
legal case started).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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all of the failures to pay.8 The judge responded “okay,” asked if Rogers had
anything to say, briefly explained federal benefits, and then stated that he
found Turner in contempt, sentencing him to a year in prison or until he had
a zero balance on his account.9 He would, however, allow Turner to be
available for work release if he had a job.10 The judge thus never made an
express finding of Turner’s ability to pay, although according to the
procedures set, this was something that he should have determined.11
Turner appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of South Carolina,
which affirmed by noting simply that Turner’s situation involves civil, not
criminal, contempt, and thus it does not require as many constitutional
safeguards.12 Turner once again appealed this decision, and the Supreme
Court decided to take up the case.13
II. The Legal Ramifications of the Decision
A. Overview of the Case’s Legal Significance
The case of Turner v. Rogers14 was significant for both the issue at
stake and its surprising holding.15 Generally, Associate Justice Stephen G.
Breyer, writing for the United States Supreme Court, decreed that indigents
in contempt of child support orders, who can receive up to one year in jail
8. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2011) (revealing how the family’s
legal case started).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 2513–14 (showing that the court did not appropriately follow due
process procedure).
12. See id. at 2516 (“Consequently, the Court has made clear (in a case not involving
the right to counsel) that, where civil contempt is at issue, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause allows a State to provide fewer procedural protections than in a criminal
case.”).
13. See id. at 2514 (explaining how the case was brought before the United States
Supreme Court).
14. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2011) (holding that child support
contemnors are not guaranteed a right to counsel in cases where they receive a sentence of
up to a year in jail, when the opposing party is also unrepresented).
15. See Mark Walsh, A Sour Note from Gideon’s Trumpet, ABA JOURNAL (Sept. 1,
2011, 3:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_sour_note_from_gideons
_trumpet/ (explaining that the outcome in the case “prompted a robust discussion” about the
critical question of the case, as well as about the basic human rights that were implicated).
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for failure to comply, and who are opposed by a custodial parent without
counsel, do not have a right to counsel as long as four procedural
safeguards are in place.16
With so many qualifiers, it is easy to overlook the Supreme Court’s
decision as of no consequence.17 But, the truth is that many American
families are in child support arrangements where Turner would apply.18
And in these circumstances, how the case is resolved is highly significant
for the quality of life that the family members will afterwards lead.19 An
Urban Institute study shows that “child support reduces the number of poor
children by a half million and lessens income inequality among children
eligible for it,” but yet, “about 70 percent of poor children eligible for child
support were not getting it in 1996.”20 This point was further highlighted in
the amicus curiae brief that United States Senators Jim DeMint, Lindsey
Graham, Mike Johanns, and Marco Rubio filed for the respondents, where
they admitted that those on Capitol Hill realize that “failure to pay child
support is a major problem that inflicts tremendous social and financial
costs on custodial parents and children.”21 Finally, as shown in one South
Carolina case study, in child contempt cases the defendant is jailed about
95% of the time.22 Thus, while judges may be jaded by the wealth of these
cases on their dockets, how they view the parties and weigh the evidence—
16. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (restating the holding in the
case).
17. See Walsh, supra note 15 (relating that the news picked up the Wal-Mart sex
discrimination case, decided the same day, instead of Turner v. Rogers).
18. See Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support
Obligor: The Silent Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 97 (2008)
(explaining that there are many child support contemnors in America).
19. See Elaine Sorenson & Chava Zibman, Child Support Offers Some Protection
Against Poverty, URBAN INSTITUTE (Mar.15, 2000), http://www.urban.org/publications/
309440.html (showing the impact that contempt cases have on the basic human needs of the
parties).
20. Id. (showing that the outcome of these proceedings has a large impact on the
financial arrangements for a child).
21. Brief for Senator Jim Demint et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10–10) (stating the senators conceded that
politicians in Congress are aware of this important aspect of the case, citing Senators Kohl
and Rockefeller as saying that child support payments are “a much-needed ‘lifeline’ for
custodial parents”).
22. Jacquelyn L. Boggess, Child Support: Ability to Pay and Incarceration, CENTER
FOR
FAMILY POLICY AND PRACTICE (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.cffpp.org/
publications/Turner%20Brief.pdf (citing a case study in the state where Turner v. Rogers
originated).
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what was decided in Turner—can be truly life changing for both parties.23
When such disputes do arise, the proceedings may very well end with jail
time for one of the parties, or result in the other sending his or her child to
bed hungry for another night.24 The case is also important for the continued
functioning of the legal system; the civil rights of due process and
government enforcement are undeniably implicated.25 Thus, Turner does
not concern trivial matters and it is worth some scrutiny.26
B. Note Outline
A reflection of the Court’s holding and reasoning in the case raises a
number of concerns, primarily because it is not clear from civil right-tocounsel case law (a so-called civil Gideon case law), general contempt case
law, or jurisprudence that the Court should have denied a right to counsel
for indigent child support contemnors.27 Due to the wealth of support in
favor of such a proposition, in fact, the Note will then examine “the
elephant in the room” to understand a possible reason for why the justices
decided to steer civil Gideon in another direction—that “elephant” being
practicality.28 Upon examination of the current legal justice system,
particularly of Sixth Amendment criminal right to counsel, and of various
states’ attempts at providing civil Gideon entitlement to counsel in such
family law cases, there is an unstated, but not to be overlooked,

23. See id. (showing that these court opinions are a factor in whether or not a child
grows up poor).
24. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (showing that Turner faced up
to a year in jail for failing to comply with the contempt order); Brief of Elizabeth G.
Patterson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 30–1, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct.
2507 (2011) (No. 10–10) (clarifying that payment failures result in numerous and significant
negative effects for the custodial family).
25. See generally id. (showing how the Supreme Court centers its discussion on the
rights that the contemnors have under the Due Process Clause in order to ensure they have
valid due process before government enforcement).
26. See id. at 2520; Brief of the Respondents at 2–3, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct.
2507 (2011) (No. 10–10) (summarily indicating that the stakes are high for both sides, even
though it is a seemingly simple family law case).
27. See Brief for Legal Aid Soc’y of the District of Columbia et al. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Turner v. Rogers 131 S.Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10) (showing that
amicus curiae believed that the Supreme Court already had on-point cases that it would use).
28. See infra notes 154–69 and accompanying text (considering how the Supreme
Court justices handled application of the Sixth Amendment to civil Gideon).
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conclusion.29 The American legal justice system would have been crippled
by a decision allowing for civil Gideon in such cases.30 The Note will
move from the Court’s analysis to its mandate—the four procedural
safeguards that the majority directs all state courts to implement instead of
civil Gideon. The author hopes to explain why the Court should not have
included mandatory safeguards and how they are unhelpful for ensuring
protection of civil rights in this family law context.31 Finally, the Note will
conclude with alternative solutions to the one that the Supreme Court chose,
and a preview of how Turner v. Rogers will be implemented in practice.32
III. The Fundamental Civil Rights Implicated by the Outcome
A. The Rights of the Contemnor
In child support contempt cases, both parties have pressing civil rights
concerns.33 Additionally, both sides are likely to have limited or no
resources, and often times they are members of historically disadvantaged
groups who may not safely assume that they receive just treatment by the
government.34 For example, a study done for the New York State Senate on
local and state civil Gideon programs repeatedly noted that there are myriad
reasons in favor of a civil Gideon, citing statistics showing that New
Yorkers may not adequately be able to represent themselves when “two29. See Jonathan David Kelley, Gideon’s Bullhorn: Sounding a Louder, Clearer Call
for a Civil Right to Counsel (Nov. 20, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2178813 (explaining
that prior decrees for right to counsel has essentially been meaningless).
30. See id. (theorizing that civil application of Gideon would not be practical for the
same reasons that criminal applications of Gideon lack quality and overburden the criminal
justice system).
31. See infra notes 170–88 and accompanying text (explaining why the author and the
legal aid community are skeptical that the safeguards will usher in any meaningful reform).
32. See infra notes 189–271 and accompanying text (predicting how the safeguards
will be used by the courts, as well as alternative solutions that the author recommends
instead of the current safeguards).
33. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2517–19 (2011) (relating that the plaintiff
is seeking vindication by the courts of her legal right to payment, while the defendant is
seeking adequate due process afforded to him under the Fourteenth Amendment).
34. See Brief in Support of Petitioner, supra note 24, at 11 (explaining that
contemnors in such cases often are parents who are deficient in education and life skills, or
who have chronic physical ailments or mental illnesses); Boggess, supra note 22, at 2
(explaining that contemnors are unlikely to be represented by counsel, which doubles their
chances of being held in contempt).
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thirds of New York adults receiving public assistance have not completed
high school . . . [and] 10 percent in NYC lack a ninth-grade education.”35
Several studies show that a large majority of these parents make less than
$10,000 a year and 70 percent of the child support arrears owed nationwide
are expected from parents who had either no quarterly earnings or had
annual earnings of less than $10,000, with only 4 percent of the debt owed
by those who earn more than $40,000.36 The Urban Institute focus study in
California found that 64 percent of the obligors had court orders practically
beyond their ability to pay.37 The underpinnings of the contemnors’ civil
rights concern, then, is often a result of overall problems with American
social justice.38 As explained by an amicus submitted by the Legal Aid
Society of the District of Columbia et al., “[a]s a practical matter, a
significant number of low-income parents genuinely are unable to make the
child support payments required of them, often for reasons that merit
sympathy rather than scorn.”39 Upon such an examination, it is clear that
although some contemnors are probably “deadbeat” and truly can pay the
support, many in the circumstances described supra seem worthy of the
government’s protection, not punishment.40
On the contemnor’s side, at stake is the individual right of liberty
being taken away only by sufficient due process under the law.41 It would
seemingly be hard, however, to assure a contemnor that such a right is
adequately safeguarded when currently, parents who appear in court
without counsel are held in contempt more than twice as often as parents

35. IOLA and Civil Legal Services. Task Force, Expanding Gideon: The Right to
Indigent Civil Representation, N.Y. STATE SENATE (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.ny
senate.gov/report/expanding-gideon-right-indigent-civil-representation.
36. Brief in Support of Petitioner, supra note 27, at 9.
37. Brief in Support of Petitioner, supra note 27, at 10.
38. See Brief in Support of Petitioner, supra note 27, at 5–6; Boggess, supra note 22,
at 2 (relating that there are many external factors outside of the defendant’s control, which
bear on whether the contemnor is able to comply with a court order).
39. Brief in Support of Petitioner, supra note 27, at 5.
40. See Brief in Support of Petitioner, supra note 27, at 5–10 (explaining that while
these people disobeyed the law, they may have no ability to obey or they may be in
circumstances that make it difficult for them to obey, so due process protection for them
should not be overlooked on the assumption that they are “bad people”).
41. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2011) (“The interest in securing that
freedom, the freedom ‘from bodily restraint,’ lies ‘at the core of the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause.’ And we have made clear that its threatened loss through legal
proceedings demands ‘due process protection.’”).
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who are represented by counsel.42 Such a fact makes it hard to believe that
the cases are being decided on the merits.43 Additionally, as the Court
noted in the case, under modern day due process considerations, a
contemnor is not supposed to be jailed if he truly cannot pay;44 this is a
debtors’ prison situation that American law diverged from years ago.45
Thus, meaningful due process is essential to guarantee that cases are
decided on the merits and that limits are set on the government’s wrath.46
B. The Rights of the Custodial Parent and the Child
On the other side of the courtroom, the custodial parent and the child
are also concerned about due process, although with a focus on procedural
due process as they are seeking vindication.47 The plaintiff is not concerned
with deprivation of liberty but she still has just as compelling an interest—
she may need the legal obligation fulfilled in order to secure the
fundamentals of survival.48 The matter is complicated, however, because
these important rights may be curtailed by helping out the contemnor
42. See Boggess, supra note 22, at 2 (citing the outcome between those contemnors
who try to resolve the deficiency with a lawyer and those who try to resolve the family
matter without); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (admitting the “obvious
truth” that “any person, haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured
a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him”).
43. See id. (showing such disparity makes it hard to believe the system is fairly
handling those sans counsel, being that it is unlikely that those with lawyers have twice as
many meritorious claims as those without).
44. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2518 (agreeing with the proposition that compares
arrearages to income and shows that contemnors usually truly do not have the means to
comply (citing Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support
Obligor: The Silent Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 117
(2008))).
45. See Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support
Obligor: The Silent Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 95 (2008)
(questioning whether contempt proceedings are bringing back debtors’ prisons).
46. See id. (“A variety of systemic and judicial flaws have coalesced to create a fertile
environment for unjustified incarcerations. Prominent among these are serious deficiencies
in current civil contempt practice. Restoration of equity and due process to this area will
require an array of adjustments in federal and state law, agency practice, and judicial
process.”).
47. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011) (explaining that the whole
proceeding is just for the mother, who wants to be enforce her right to be paid).
48. See Sorenson, supra note 19 (stating that only 21 percent of the children in these
arrangements live in households where the income exceeds 300 percent of the poverty
threshold).
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parent, and vice versa.49 Providing additional procedural protection for the
debtor, such as a right to a lawyer, would upset the balance between the two
parties because the plaintiff usually cannot afford representation herself.50
Additionally with only pro se representation in the courtroom, the court is
more likely to reach a more efficient solution, which benefits the plaintiff
and the child.51 Summarily, an evaluation of the rights of one party in the
legal system cannot be examined alone; the right of others are often
implicated accordingly.52
IV. Civil Gideon Denied
Considering the competing interests at stake, it is reasonable to
conclude that both parties’ arguments had merits and that reasonable minds
could differ on this issue.53 It was therefore surprising that the Supreme
Court was unanimous in its decision that child support contemnors, under
these circumstances, do not receive a right to counsel.54 Such an outcome
seems especially surprising when one considers that the justices have
strongly conflicting interpreting principles on matters such as due process.55
Perhaps the 9-0 decision could then be justified on the reasoning that the
justices did more than weigh interests, such as competing hardship and civil
rights, and instead based their decision on current law and jurisprudence.56
49. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519 (“A requirement that the State provide counsel to
the noncustodial parent in these cases could create an asymmetry of representation that
would ‘alter significantly the nature of the proceeding.’”).
50. See Brief in Support of Respondent, supra note 21, at 4 (“Upsetting the balance
would be a particularly serious problem in the child support context, where custodial parents
are often pro se.”).
51. See Brief for Law Professors Benjamin Barton and Darryl Brown in Support of
Respondent at 9, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10–10) (suggesting that
empirical data shows that pro se representation is more likely to lead to a solution, and thus
at least some type of resolution).
52. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519 (showing that the Supreme Court recognizes the
dynamic between these two interests).
53. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011) (revealing that the Supreme
Court considered both the opposing interests at stake to be significant).
54. See id. at 2507–09 (stating the unanimous holding of the Court).
55. See Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L.
REV. 63, 115–23 (2006) (using the case of Lawrence v. Texas, among others, to show how
there are different Court interpretations as to what “due process” means).
56. See id. (showing how interpretations of the law differ).
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Yet, an examination of these authorities below proves that the justices did
not use these in reaching their decision either, and because of this, the Note
proposes an answer of why the justices were nonetheless able to unite in
this case.57 The supposition is plainly that this case was decided as a
common sense conclusion from a survey of the legal system instead of the
result of an attempted Due Process Clause interpretation.58 To prove such a
conclusion, the Note turns to surveying the pre-Turner landscape.59
A. How Civil Gideon Case Law Pre-Turner Had Already Answered the
Question
A beginning point for examining how the case should have been
decided is how the courts have ruled in similar cases—the law on the
books.60 Although Turner is explicitly limited to child support contempt
proceedings, before the case was decided the Court had already taken up
the issue of whether a lawyer should be required in a civil matter such as
this family law issue.61 In particular, the two cases of Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services of Durham County62 and In Re Gault63
addressed such concern.64 There is also the crucial contempt case of
Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Company65 that provides some guidance
57. See infra notes 154–69 and accompanying text (asserting the proposition that the
justices may have reached their unanimity for practical reasons).
58. See infra notes 154–69 and accompanying text (explaining how the realities of the
legal system can be juxtaposed next to Due Process discussion).
59. See infra notes 60–153 and accompanying text (analyzing the pre-Turner case law
that could have been used in deciding the case).
60. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2510 (2011) (showing that Justice Breyer’s
analysis of this due process issue also begins with a survey of case law).
61. See generally Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (analyzing
whether there is a right to counsel in another family law matter, one involving parental status
termination proceedings).
62. See id. at 34 (concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause does
not mandate representation for an indigent parent in parental status termination proceeding).
63. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause “requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which
may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the
child and his parents must be notified of the child’s right to be represented by counsel
retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to
represent the child”).
64. See id.; see also Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 34 (showing that the issue in these cases was
whether civil Gideon was guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment).
65. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 452 (1911) (dismissing
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in this matter.66 Additionally, although not controlling, the state cases of
Pasqua v. Council67 and Krieger v. Commonwealth68 contained helpful
legal analysis.69 Altogether, the law had already begun to form how the
civil Gideon issue in Turner would be handled, although not in the direction
that Turner turned it.70
1. United States Supreme Court Case Law
a. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County
Both sides and Justice Breyer could not avoid mention of one 1981
United States Supreme Court case: Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services of Durham County.71 This is because in Lassiter, the pertinent
question was whether an indigent mother had a right to counsel in a child
custody proceeding.72 The Court, instead of answering ‘yes’ or ‘no,’
punted the question of whether the parental termination proceedings in their
states needed this due process requirement to the lower courts.73 Perhaps
because of the slightly different end goal of the litigant—child custody
instead of child custody payments—and because the right to counsel was
the case in part because the lower court treated the injunctive case as if it was a criminal
proceeding when really it should have proceeded in equity).
66. See id. at 441–44 (providing guidance on whether a contempt case is civil or
criminal in nature, which is a preliminary question for the case at hand because criminal
defendants with a possibility of imprisonment are guaranteed counsel under the Sixth
Amendment, while civil Gideon is not provided for in the U.S. Constitution).
67. See Pasqua v. Council, 892 A.2d 663, 666 (N.J. 2006) (holding that the Federal
and State Constitutions provide for a right to counsel in child support contempt cases).
68. See Krieger v. Commonwealth, 567 S.E.2d 557, 564 (Va. Ct. App. 2002) (finding
that a person held in civil contempt for failure to abate a nuisance was not guaranteed a right
to counsel in order to order to ensure substantial justice for due process).
69. See id.; see also Pasqua, 892 A.2d at 666 (showing that these state cases also
address civil Gideon issues at stake in Turner).
70. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1967) (showing that the United States
Supreme Court found that the Due Process Clause necessitated the availability of counsel in
at least this one civil proceeding).
71. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2510 (2011) (indicating that Justice Breyer
started discussing Lassiter at the beginning of his opinion).
72. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33–34 (1981) (concluding that
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause does not mandate representation for an
indigent parent in parental status termination proceeding).
73. See id. at 31–32 (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli as allowing lower courts to weigh the
Mathews v. Eldridge factors for more individualized determinations).
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never explicitly granted, the Turner Court did not give the case much
weight.74 But many parts of the decision, including the method of
analyzing civil Gideon cases, are seemingly on point.75
For example, after Justice Stewart, the authoring justice, summarized
previous right-to-counsel cases, he “note[d] that Gideon was sentenced to
prison for five years, that Argersinger was also imprisoned if only briefly,
that Gault was committed to an institution in which his freedom was
curtailed, and that Scott had no right to counsel because he was not actually
sentenced to confinement.”76 In essence, he explains that the cases in
which the Supreme Court granted counsel involved confinement as a
possible sentence.77 The justice then reads this case law as saying that there
is actually a presumption in favor of an appointed lawyer when
confinement is a penalty.78 The justice proceeded to distinguish Lassiter
based upon the fact that the potential punishment was denial of child
custody privileges, not imprisonment.79 Reapplying this analysis to Turner
shows that the case’s circumstances, under which the defendant could
potentially be jailed for a significant amount of time, align with the Court’s
presumption in favor of counsel.80 Therefore, although the Court used this
case to support their decision to not grant counsel, citing it as precedent of a
civil case where counsel was not granted, Lassiter can more correctly be
seen as precedent that a Turner scenario would be found deserving of this
extra procedural protection.81 The way in which Lassiter tied deprivation
74. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2515–17 (showing that Justice Breyer disposes of
precedent in a few short paragraphs, seemingly finding limited guidance, and no on-point
discussion).
75. See infra notes 76–85 and accompanying text (explaining that many parts of the
Lassiter opinion seem to be applicable to Turner).
76. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Story of Lassiter: The Importance of Counsel in an
Adversary System, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 514–15 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed.
2004).
77. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25–26 (observing that all previous Court holdings where
the right to counsel has been granted involved a threat of imprisonment).
78. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26–27 (1981) (“[T]he Court’s
precedents speak with one voice about what ‘fundamental fairness’ has meant when the
Court has considered the right to appointed counsel, . . . an indigent litigant has a right to
appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty.”).
79. See id. at 31 (examining the parental interests at stake when doing a Mathews
balancing test).
80. See id. at 26–27 (setting up a presumption against which “all the other elements in
the due process decision must be measured”).
81. See id. (evidencing that Lassiter was not limited in any way to parental
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of liberty to the right to counsel merits more discussion than the Turner
Court affords it.82
Another relevant part of the Lassiter opinion involved the Court’s
statement that it did not have to limit itself to constitutional interpretation
when determining whether to appoint counsel in civil cases.83 Justice
Stewart explained that public policy may also be considered, and that it
may require “higher standards be adopted than those minimally tolerable
under the Constitution.”84 In Lassiter, the Court could not decide whether
the addition of counsel would add to the fairness and justice of the
proceedings and so left the decision to the discretion to the states.85 In
contrast, looking at both the risk of error and the more severe punishment in
Turner, a strong argument can be made that adding the right to counsel will
result in a significantly more just proceeding.86
To conclude, it is clear that Lassiter was cited by the amicus curiae of
Turner for good reason.87 While the Court never came down strongly in
Lassiter, it certainly did set the stage for the provision of counsel in a
situation exactly like Turner’s.88
b. In re Gault
Another case that Justice Breyer disregarded as not being on point was
In re Gault.89 Yet, this case also deserved more attention than the justice
proceedings, but instead seems applicable to civil family law cases generally).
82. See id. at 26 (concluding that as “the litigant’s interest in personal liberty
diminishes, so does his right to appointed counsel”).
83. See id. at 37 (“Where an individual’s liberty interest assumes sufficiently weighty
constitutional significance, and the State by a formal and adversarial proceeding seeks to
curtail that interest, the right to counsel may be necessary to ensure fundamental fairness.”).
84. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981) (providing an
additional factor to the Mathews balancing test that courts should consider for analyzing a
grant of civil Gideon).
85. See id. at 31–32 (discussing that many factors, like those of informality, flexibility,
and economy, were best to decide on a case-by-case basis).
86. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2512 (2011) (noting that the interest at
stake in Turner is a risk of incarceration, not simply a child custody proceeding).
87. See Thornburg, supra note 76, at 523–26 (explaining that several lessons can be
learned from Lassiter in regards to the appointment of counsel).
88. See id. at 524 (showing how the conclusions from Lassiter are broad, and thus they
could be applicable to civil Gideon cases generally, particularly to other family law civil
Gideon cases).
89. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2510 (listing In re Gault as another case that does not
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afforded it.90 In In re Gault, the United States Supreme Court afforded a
right to counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings.91 Because Turner was
not a juvenile proceding, Justice Breyer would be right if a narrow
interpretation of In re Gault is taken.92 However, juvenile delinquency
proceedings, like child contempt cases, are noncriminal family law matters
with a potential for incarceration.93 Additionally, there is no explicit right
to counsel in such matters; instead, the Court read this due process
requirement from the Fourteenth Amendment.94 Therefore, the conclusion
that In re Gault was not reasonable precedent for Turner v. Rogers is a
questionable one.95
In Turner, the justices never fully explained why Lassiter and In re
Gault were distinguishable, nor did they explicitly overrule the cases.96
Either of these alternatives would have left those reading the Turner
opinion satisfied with the Court’s reasoning, but because the Court did
neither, it is a mystery why the Court’s recent civil Gideon analysis was not
given more attention.97
c. Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Company
Finally, a Supreme Court case not directly dealing with civil Gideon,
but instead with the distinction between civil and criminal contempt,
demands attention because Justice Breyer’s reasoning in Turner was
founded on the distinction it established.98 In 1911, the Court in Gompers
provide any definitive answer for Turner).
90. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1967) (granting a right to counsel in a civil
case where the defendant faced possible confinement).
91. See id. (explaining the holding of the case).
92. See generally Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (discussing civil Gideon in
the child contempt setting, not in a juvenile proceeding).
93. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 76–77 (explaining the procedure of a juvenile case).
94. See id. at 30–31 (showing that the Court derived the requirement of a right to
counsel from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause where it was not explicitly
granted).
95. See id. (demonstrating that the exact same analysis was used in both In re Gault
and Turner v. Rogers).
96. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2516 (interpreting precedent to draw a presumption in
favor of counsel when there is a possibility of incarceration, but not deriving any further
legal guidance from the cases).
97. See id. (showing that the Court never made any effort to distinguish Lassiter and
In re Gault).
98. See Boggess, supra note 22, at 1 (“The court based its decision on the difference
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v. Buck’s Stove & Range Company declared that if a contemnor can choose
to obey his sentence at any time, then the contemnor has the possibility of
release within his own discretion—he has the keys to his jail cell in his
pocket.99 In such cases, the sentence is meant for coercion instead of
punishment, and the contempt is a civil one.100
In practice, however, the civil and criminal contempt distinction is far
from clear-cut.101 For example, in the 2006 New Jersey Supreme Court
case of Pasqua v. Council, the Court started its analysis with an internal
conflict among the state’s laws.102 The Court found precedent which stated
that a contempt proceeding is “essentially criminal” in nature and is ordered
for the purpose of the contemnor’s punishment.103 In contrast, however,
another law stated that an order to enforce a litigant’s right against a
defendant was “essentially civil” because the major benefit of the contempt
order is for the civil litigant.104 The type of conflict here has reasonably led
to confusion, and modern day judges have been in a quandary about how to
distinguish among the contempt cases in accordance with Gompers case
law.105 Even the American Bar Association has conceded that “the line
between civil and criminal contempt proceedings has become increasingly
blurred . . . and thus cannot provide a useful basis for determining the right
to counsel where personal liberty is at stake.”106 And as one observer
commented, “it’s kind of shocking to see no right to counsel in a case

between civil and criminal contempt . . . .”).
99. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 452 (1911) (relating the
holding in the case).
100. See id. at 441–43 (explaining the distinction between a civil and criminal contempt
case).
101. See Brief of Nat’l Assoc. of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. at 5, Turner v. Roger,
131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10) (explaining that the civil and criminal is not a distinction
that is easily vetted out).
102. See Pasqua v. Council, 892 A.2d 663, 670 (N.J. 2006) (showing that in one
paragraph, the court concludes that the proceeding is “essentially criminal,” and then in the
next paragraph says that it is “essentially civil”).
103. See id. (citing several cases and a statute for the proposition that the case should be
considered a criminal one).
104. See id. (citing a statute and Judicial Counsel as saying that the case is a civil one
because of its intended result—vindication).
105. See Brief of Nat’l Assoc. of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. at 5, Turner v. Roger,
131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10) (relating the confusion of the courts in interpreting and
applying Gompers to modern day cases on this matter).
106. Id.
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which someone faces more jail time than he would face for criminal
contempt.”107
Yet for legal analysis that has caused immense confusion and
application among highly intellectual individuals, Justice Breyer disposed
of his contempt distinction analysis fairly quickly, and he did so with
questionable reasoning.108 The justice assumed that in child contempt
matters the defendants have the ability to pay, and they therefore have the
ability to release themselves from jail at any time.109 He in fact declared
that he was sure that the defendants had income, such as from illegal drug
dealing, but that they were simply not reporting it to the courts.110 This is a
strong assumption to make, particularly because statistics like the ones cited
supra show that this assumption does not seem to be an accurate one.111 In
the particular case of Turner v. Rogers, the family court never found that
Turner presently had the ability to pay.112 It seems more likely, if following
the reasoning laid out in Gompers, that Turner’s contempt was not a civil
matter.113 Such a conclusion is important because part of the reason Justice
Breyer said he could rest easy with less procedural safeguards is because
the case was one of civil contempt.114 If the justices analyzed the situation
with a fresh look at Gompers, they may not have been so quick to decide
that the proceeding was civil, that less protective due process procedures
were then constitutional, and that therefore there is no afforded right to

107. Walsh, supra note 15.
108. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516–17 (showing that the Court relates the
basic holding of Gompers, and seemingly does not really apply the rule to the facts of the
current case).
109. See id. at 2526.
110. See id. (concluding that child support contemnors actually do have the ability to
pay, but that this simply will not be found by the court because they are working in illegal
markets).
111. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 27, at 9 (relating that the financial situation
of these contemnors is often abysmal).
112. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2509 (“The judge found Turner in willful contempt and
sentenced him to 12 months in prison without making any finding as to his ability to pay or
indicating on the contempt order form whether he was able to make support payments.”).
113. See id. at 2516 (showing that where Justice Breyer analyzed Gompers, he
incorrectly relied on the contemnor having the ability to pay, and that if this assumption is
corrected, then the inability to pay may take Turner out of the civil context).
114. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011) (relating that the justice was
going to follow case law supporting the notion that less procedural protection can be allowed
for civil cases than must be ensured for criminal ones).
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counsel.115 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not engage in such
reasoning and they proceeded to a Mathews v. Eldridge116 analysis instead,
one that can be criticized in its own regard.117
2. Influential Case Law
Beyond the Supreme Court, though, civil Gideon law was still being
theorized and applied, and therefore before Turner reached the Court there
was a wealth of judicial opinions addressing this due process concern.118
Although not controlling on the Court, these analyses are helpful guidance
on how to apply jurisprudence to the matter.119 This is especially true
because the matter is a family law concern, which is traditionally handled
by the states, and it is an area where the judges have experience and
expertise.120 Two cases particularly worthy of examination are Pasqua v.
Council and Krieger v. Commonwealth.121
a. Pasqua v. Council
In Pasqua, which was a child support contempt case like Turner, the
2006 New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the legality of civil Gideon
under both the state and federal laws and Constitutions.122 In this child
115. See id. (analyzing the civil and criminal distinction with both falsely laid
assumption and without much application to the particular facts of a child support contempt
case).
116. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341–48 (1976) (relating that risk of error,
weight of private interest, and interests of other parties are the three factors to be examined
when analyzing what due process is constitutionally granted before a private interest, like
liberty, is taken away by the government).
117. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2510 (relating that the Court spent most of its opinion on
its Mathews analysis, instead of analyzing the foundation of its reasoning, which is
determined through Gompers analysis).
118. See Thornburg, supra note 76, at 513–17 (listing numerous right to appointed
counsel cases that the Court decided previously).
119. See Thornburg, supra note 76, at 513–17 (examining principles applicable to
Turner, even if the case law is determined to not be on point).
120. See Helen Alvare, Traditional Family Law: Connecting Marriage with Children,
THE WITHERSPOON INST. (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/12/4397/
(“It is important to understand that family law is made in large part at the state level.”).
121. See infra notes 122–53 and accompanying text.
122. See Pasqua v. Council, 892 A.2d. 663, 666 (N.J. 2006) (explaining at the very
beginning of the opinion that the court determined to analyze due process implications under
both the Federal and the State Constitution).
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support contempt case, the judges explained that the right to counsel is
implicit in the New Jersey Constitution, but that furthermore, such a
concept is also within the U.S. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause.123
Judge Albin, who wrote the opinion of the Court, explained that based
on the above United States Supreme Court precedent, the civil and criminal
contempt distinction should not be the deciding factor for counsel
assignment.124 Instead, what is decisive is whether there is adequate due
process in order for justice to result.125 The judge then engaged in a
detailed discussion about whether a child support contempt proceeding
without a lawyer is a fair one—a type of analysis that was absent in
Turner.126 The Court explicitly rejected the assumptions of the Turner
Supreme Court, seemingly relying more heavily on studies explaining the
high risk of error and revealing that frequently judges do not make an
express finding of a contemnor’s ability to pay.127 As Justice Breyer then
cites the same findings in his opinion, it is surprising that the United States
Supreme Court does not also find the studies to be significantly troubling.128
Additionally, the judges made an interesting observation not made by
the Supreme Court justices.129 While the Turner justices noted that such
proceedings repeatedly occur for the same family—Turner had previously
123. See id. at 674, 675 (concluding that a right to counsel is a necessary procedural
protection for these types of contempt cases).
124. See id. at 671 (relating that the judge did not take a strictly Gompers analysis for
the basis for his decision, in contrast to Justice Breyer).
125. See id. (examining the requirements for due process and deciding, like in Lassiter,
that “fundamental fairness” can also be a factor, even if not a requirement from the
Constitution itself).
126. See id. at 671 (“Although requiring counsel may complicate the procedures
pertaining to enforcement of court orders, it protects important constitutional values,
including the fairness of our civil justice system.”); see generally Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.
Ct. 2507 (2011).
127. See id. at 673 (“When an indigent litigant is forced to proceed at an ability-to-pay
hearing without counsel, there is a high risk of an erroneous determination and wrongful
incarceration.”).
128. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2011).
(referencing studies and the case of McBride v. McBride, which both conclude that “failure
of trial courts to make a determination of a contemnor's ability to comply is not altogether
infrequent”).
129. See Pasqua v. Council, 892 A.2d 663, 673 (N.J. 2006) (explaining that “[t]he task
is that much more difficult when the indigent must defend himself after he has already been
deprived of his freedom”).
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been sentenced to jail and was likely to be sentenced again—they do not
take any type of conclusion from this except as assurance that the case was
not moot.130 The Pasqua court, though, after making the same finding, used
that conclusion to argue that the task of sound pro se representation is
“much more difficult when the indigent must defend himself after he has
already been deprived of his freedom.”131 This more thorough analysis
picks up on an additional reason for civil Gideon that is missing from the
Turner opinion—that these contemnors are less and less likely to have the
resources necessary to make a case, yet at the same time they are also less
and less likely to have an ability to pay.132 It is unclear how Turner v.
Rogers was decided without weighing such a compelling factor, especially
one that had already been discussed in case law by the time that the case
reached the bench.133
The judges in the case then proceeded to do a Mathews balancing test,
much like the one that the majority decided to do in Turner.134 Because of
the above reasons, however, the Pasqua court concluded that the available
procedure was insufficient, stating that, “We cannot accept the regime
suggested by defendants as an acceptable constitutional safeguard for an
indigent litigant facing incarceration in a judicial proceeding. The good
intentions and fair-mindedness of a Superior Court judge are not an
adequate constitutional substitute for a defendant’s right to counsel when
jail time is at stake.”135 The Court underscored this understanding by
stating that even though it trusted both the judges and the fundamentals of
the justice system, this type of proceeding is more complicated than it may
seem.136 A well-executed defense in such a case requires more than just
130. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2514–15 (relating that the case is not moot because it is
“capable of repetition” yet “evading review” because of the continually renewed hearings on
child contempt that one family will face).
131. See Pasqua, 892 A.2d at 673 (implicating that contempt cases are a particular type
of civil case where due process may be more at risk because of the worsening conditions that
the defendant finds himself in).
132. See id. (examining the reality that because these are repeat cases, the defendant
will likely find himself in a worse and worse condition to represent himself sans counsel).
133. See generally Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (showing that discussion
on this concern is absent from any of the Supreme Court opinions).
134. See Pasqua, 892 A.2d at 672 (“The Mathews factors must be weighed against the
presumptive right to appointed counsel that attaches when an indigent is subject to
incarceration.”).
135. Pasqua v. Council, 892 A.2d 663, 670 (N.J. 2006).
136. See id. at 673 (explaining that while tasks such as gathering evidence, presenting
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document production; it still requires filing legal documents and structuring
compelling legal arguments.137 Essentially, more procedure was needed
than one may believe.138
b. Krieger v. Commonwealth
Further guidance also came from the dissenting opinion of Judge
Annuziata in the 2002 Virginia appellate case of Krieger v.
Commonwealth.139 Again, because this case was not controlling for the
Supreme Court, the Court was free to easily overlook or ignore it.140 Still,
Judge Annuziata’s opinion was a great overview of civil Gideon law and
jurisprudence behind the pro-counsel argument in child support contempt
cases.141 The judge closely examined the civil right of due process before
incarceration and made the compelling argument that liberty is a
fundamental interest, one that affects not just the quality of one’s life but
also one’s career and reputation.142 Justice Breyer spent only a few short
paragraphs on this interest—deprivation of liberty for up to a year of the
defendant’s life—and he did not discuss these interests in career and
reputation.143 Altogether, though, these interests are too significant for the
amount of attention that they were given.144
testimony, and articulating a defense may seem simple to a lawyer or a judge, these are
“perhaps insuperable undertakings to the uninitiated layperson”).
137. See id. (evidencing that the proceeding is not an easy one for the defendant to
handle, and thus it cannot be assumed that a layperson can proceed in court alone).
138. See id. (suggesting that perhaps the legal professionals who are deciding these
cases cannot understand how an ordinary person would handle representation incorrectly,
even though they certainly may).
139. See Krieger v. Commonwealth, 567 S.E.2d 557, 586–87 (Va. Ct. App. 2002)
(Annuziata, J., dissenting) (examining the issue of whether the government should guarantee
a nuisance contemnor a lawyer).
140. See id. at 559 (showing that it was a Virginia Appellate Court case, which means
that it is not controlling precedent for the Supreme Court).
141. See id. at 578–84 (examining a large amount of cases addressing civil Gideon).
142. See id. at 586 (pointing out a defendant in contempt’s civil rights interests in cases
where there is a possibility of incarceration).
143. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518–19 (2011) (admitting that the risk of
error in Turner is high, but nonetheless not spending much time examining the interplay of
this Mathews factor with the interests of others in order to explain how the interests of others
must ultimately outweigh this factor).
144. See Krieger, 567 S.E.2d at 577 n.3 (relating that the dissent spends too much time
talking about how opinions like the majority’s incorrectly apply the Mathews factors).
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Additionally, like the Pasqua court, Judge Annuziata disregarded any
reliance on the civil and criminal distinction and instead made clear that jail
is jail.145 He explained that many other judges have also ignored the
distinction because of this hard fact, citing, for example, Walker v.
McLain,146 where the court decided in favor of the right to counsel because
“jail is just as bleak” for the civil litigant.147 This is simply a strong logical
argument in favor of civil Gideon.148 Also, although Justice Thomas argued
against the right to counsel because of the absence of an explicit civil
counterpart to the Sixth Amendment in the Constitution, a counterargument
using the logic that Judge Annuziata provides is that, simply put,
Americans have explicitly recognized in this constitutional provision that
counsel is needed at times for adequate due process, and the quintessential
punishment where right to counsel process is afforded is imprisonment.149
And if the American people feel that counsel is needed in order to ensure a
fair trial for those facing imprisonment in one courtroom, the same
safeguards may be needed where the exact same punishment is set in
another.150 Justice Thomas’ point seems to then be countered, but it is hard
to know how Justice Thomas would respond because he did not fully
engage in this analysis.151
Overall, then, while the Court cited very little precedent in its opinion,
and concluded that none were directly on point, upon examination of the
prior case law, at least some of the arguments, modes of analysis, and
145. See Krieger v. Commonwealth, 567 S.E.2d 557, 580 n.5 (Va. Ct. App. 2002)
(“Indeed, the very nature of the proceeding and the resulting relief must be discerned
especially in cases of contempt, where the line between civil and criminal penalties has
become increasingly blurred in order to determine the proper applicability of federal
constitutional protections.”).
146. See Walker v. McLain, 768 F.2d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 1985) (denying a habeas
corpus petition that incarceration without counsel violated the petitioner’s due process rights
because the court did not find that the petitioner could not afford a lawyer).
147. See Krieger, 567 S.E.2d at 562–65 (explaining that the civil and criminal
distinction does not make much sense when the penalties for both are the same).
148. See id. (showing that perhaps the distinction set forth in Gompers is not applicable
to the contempt cases under discussion).
149. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2521–23 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(surveying Justice Thomas’s arguments regarding the Sixth Amendment).
150. See id. (comparing the civil contempt case to those criminal cases to which the
Sixth Amendment applies).
151. See id. at 2521–27 (showing that Justice Thomas did not discuss the outstanding
similarities between the child support contempt cases and the ones which he approves of
counsel being afforded to).
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concepts should have been addressed in Turner.152 Unfortunately, very few
were, with the end result that there is now less procedural protection for
these defendants without much guidance as to why the state courts, who
attempted better protection for them, were wrong.153
V. Practicality Discussion—The Glaringly Avoided Topic
Given this gaping analysis of existing law and jurisprudence, and
given the current state of the legal system, it is worth mentioning the idea
that Turner v. Rogers may simply have been a practical decision because
there is just no way that America could give all of its Turners lawyers.154
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court stated in Lassiter that the costs of
providing counsel should not be considered a significant factor when
deciding whether or not to provide counsel, it is actually an unavoidable
conclusion.155
First, the current state of criminal Gideon seems to make this
obvious.156 Recently, Attorney General Eric Holder called attention to
several prime examples of this, like a Tennessee public defender office
where six attorneys are assigned to handle 10,000 misdemeanor cases per
year.157 Sadly, however, even a story like this included in the Attorney
General’s overview of criminal Gideon justice does not even do the
situation justice.158 Upon examination of criminal Gideon, one cannot help
152. See generally Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (showing that very few of
the aforementioned civil rights concerns were brought under the purview of the Court).
153. See id. (showing that the Supreme Court barely addressed compelling state cases
on this subject, like Pasqua, nor did it spend much attention on relevant Supreme Court
cases).
154. Tod Aronovitz, Gideon—Then and Now, 77 FLA. BAR J. 6 (2003), available at
http://www.floridabar.org/divcom/jn/jnjournal01.nsf/Author/C2185D2B6A0C301785256CD
9004E5ABD (citing Stephen Bright, the director of the Southern Center for Human Rights in
Atlanta, Georgia, as summating that “‘[n]o constitutional right is celebrated so much in the
abstract and observed so little in reality as the right to counsel’”).
155. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981) (“But though the
State's pecuniary interest is legitimate, it is hardly significant enough to overcome private
interests as important as those here . . . .”).
156. See Kelley, supra note 29, at 5–7 (relating several studies that show how criminal
Gideon is not functioning properly).
157. See Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 62
FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1252–53 (2010).
158. See id. (revealing that the stories of the Attorney General are only a few of the
many that, in their totality, prove that government-appointed counsel is not sufficient).
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but admit that “[a]t the trial level, because every indigent is entitled to free
counsel, few if any receive competent representation.”159 As one scholar
aptly puts it, “Appointing counsel who—due to any number of factors—
provide sub-par representation strips Gideon of its radical dexterity, and
replaces Gideon’s mighty trumpet with the equivalent of a child’s
kazoo.”160
Secondly, even stepping back from the current Gideon system, there
are overarching reasons for why civil Gideon will not come to fruition.161
Currently, many child support contemnors proceed as defendants sans
counsel.162 But any economist would have to conclude that the present
situation would be drastically worse if litigants like Turner were allowed
government-funded counsel, for “if you price a good or service below the
market rate, people will want more of it . . . and that’s not necessarily good
for the litigants themselves, or for society as a whole.”163 From current
government attempts into this realm, it seems clear that such a system
would be prohibitively expensive while providing less than an adequate
quality of protection.164
As mentioned above, however, these glaring practical limitations
should not play a part in the ruling, and on its face, they didn’t; the Court
never expressly addressed such limitations in Turner, and the former
Lassiter holding can perhaps be seen to silently stand in instead.165 Still, it
159. See Lawrence J. Siskind, Civil Gideon: An Idea Whose Time Should Not Come,
AMERICAN THINKER (Aug. 6, 2011), http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/08/civil_gideon
_an_idea_whose_time_should_not_come.html (highlighting the fact that sometimes wellintended plans do not implement well upon practice).
160. See Kelley, supra note 29, at 5 (explaining that prior decrees for right to counsel
has essentially been meaningless).
161. See Siskind, supra note 159 (explaining how civil Gideon would function in
accordance with micro and macroeconomic principles).
162. Joy Moses, Grounds for Objection: Causes and Consequences of America’s Pro
Se Crisis and How to Solve the Problem of Unrepresented Litigants, CENTER FOR AMERICAN
PROGRESS 3–5 (June 2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/06/pdf/object
ion.pdf (explaining that pro se representation is normal with both low and moderate-income
litigants, as well as in family law cases).
163. See Siskind, supra note 159.
164. See id. (explaining why free services do not function well with a market
economy).
165. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981) (showing that in
Lassiter, the Court clarified that the cost of providing counsel should not be a significant
factor in whether to provide this procedural protection); see generally Turner v. Rogers, 131
S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (revealing that this precedent on weighing state costs is absent from the
Court’s discussion in Turner).
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is impossible to discuss the options before the Court in this case without
discussing that there may have really only been one option.166 A right to
civil Gideon would have crippled what many believe is already an
extremely broken system.167 If the Court mandated something that actually
could never occur, there are two potential, devastating consequences: first,
the courts will not be able to handle actually providing the right, and any
just and swift consideration under the law would be close to impossible;
and second, the American people would likely doubt the vitality of their
legal justice system as a result.168 Surely the justices must have considered
such consequences, and thus the absence of any discussion of them in the
Turner opinion, either in the majority or the dissent, is significant.169
VI. Mandated Procedural Safeguards
The Turner majority concluded that four procedural safeguards should
be mandated down to the states to ensure that the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause is still being upheld even without a right to counsel.170
These four protections are:
(1) notice to the defendant that his “ability to pay” is a critical issue in
the contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or the equivalent) to
elicit relevant financial information from him; (3) an opportunity at the
hearing for him to respond to statements and questions about his
financial status; and (4) an express finding by the court that the
defendant has the ability to pay.171

166. See Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding
and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 969 (2012) (explaining that resources
are already spread too thin and that instituting civil Gideo “would undercut Gideon itself”).
167. See id. at 990–91 (2012) (examining the budgets of government and explaining
that, “[i]n the past, the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged funding constraints as a
reason not to expand the right to counsel”).
168. See Joy Moses, supra note 162, at 5–7 (revealing that often these types of cases
can proceed through the court system faster with only pro se representation, while also
explaining that our society has a reliance on the court system to function properly, saying
that “[u]naddressed legal needs threaten commonly shared notions that America is a place
where anyone can get justice.”).
169. See Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, supra note 167, at 990 (showing that
the justices have talked about funding concerns in prior cases).
170. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011) (explaining that the Court
mandated four “substitute procedural safeguards”).
171. Id.
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The majority also left open the option of having more safeguards in
place; a state after Turner may still institute a mandatory right to counsel
program.172 This gives leeway to states that already had civil Gideon
systems in place.173 For example, California, as one of the blindly
optimistic states to take on such an obligation, has tried to implement such a
program but has not to date successfully carried it out.174 In fact, the
program has already seemingly amounted to a disaster, as the state has had
to slash its funding and send out layoff notices to about a third of its
employees.175
Regardless, more safeguards may indeed be needed as the ones the
Court prescribes were never vetted out, either before the case was decided
or during it.176 As Justice Thomas explained, the case was simply about
whether an indigent child support contemnor should receive a right to
counsel.177 All nine justices answered ‘no.’178 The parties were not asking
what procedure was then due instead, but the majority nevertheless entered
into such a discussion, from which the safeguards followed.179 Because the
parties did not raise the issue of what procedure was due, however, the
Court did not have many due process suggestions before it.180 In fact, it
only had one such suggestion before it—that found in the federal
172. See id. at 2519–20 (claiming that the Court is receptive to other procedural
safeguard alternatives in addition to the four just presented).
173. See id. (explaining that the Supreme Court is not limiting states to only these
procedural safeguards for the due process rights of child support contemnors, although
certainly not leaving the states as much leeway as the Court did in Lassiter).
174. See Siskind, supra note 159 (describing California’s attempt at providing civil
Gideon services).
175. See Siskind, supra note 159 (relating that to date, the state has been unable to keep
the program fully operational).
176. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2524–26 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for incorrectly decreeing four safeguards when the Supreme Court
had an insufficient record for that issue, and explaining that it was in answer to “a question
raised exclusively in the Federal Government’s amicus brief”).
177. See id. at 2521 (clarifying that there was only one issue before the Court, not an
additional one of what procedure a state should be required to provide to future child
contemnor defendants).
178. See Barton & Bibas, supra note 167, at 970 (explaining the total unanimity of the
Court’s decision on this issue).
179. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2512, 2519 (showing where Justice Breyer presented the
issue before the Court, and then later where he mandated four procedural safeguards related
to, but nevertheless not in line with, the issue).
180. See id. at 2524 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“As here, the parties may not address the
new issue in this Court, leaving its boundaries untested.”).
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government’s amicus curae brief.181 This switch in discussion is something
Justice Thomas rightly criticized because American law is usually the result
of diverse opinions and experiences coming together in the legislature, not
the summation of one viewpoint of a group not even a party to the case.182
Additionally, the safeguards are then not even assuredly effective; they
were just the only suggestion on the table.183 If the Court was going to
proceed in this manner, it should have considered other options to the
adopted ones, like vetted suggestions from those dealing with the child
support contempt cases regularly.184 As one observer noticed, the Court is
far removed from how these cases actually function, and it thus may not be
wise for them to assume they know the solution without gathering other
expert legal opinions.185 “And of course, solutions to the pro se crisis
should be guided by evidence-based approaches.”186 While not necessary,
evidence about the strength of particular procedural protections would have
helped the Court make a more informed decision. Louis S. Rulli, a
professor at University of Pennsylvania Law School, while not talking
specifically about the civil contempt cases, nevertheless sums this up nicely
by stating that, “an overarching lesson from legal needs studies is that
empirical research plays an important role in enhancing access to justice.
Our society relies heavily upon empirical data to assess the efficacy of
181. See R. Reeves Anderson & Anthony J. Franze, Commentary: The Court’s
increasing reliance on amicus curiae in the past term, NAT’L L. J., (Aug. 24, 2011),
available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Arnold&PorterLLP_Nation
alLawJournal_8.24.11.pdf (explaining that the Supreme Court’s use of only one amicus
curiae to decide the case is part of a larger legal trend where the Court is increasingly relying
on amicus curiae briefs).
182. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2524. (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“Accordingly, it is the wise and settled general practice of this Court not to consider an
issue in the first instance, much less one raised only by an amicus.”).
183. See id. at 2525 (claiming that the majority said that they did know what they states
were doing or what the “range of options out there” were).
184. See Jeffrey Selbin, Josh Rosenthal & Jeanne Charn, Access to Evidence: How an
Evidence-Based Delivery System Can Improve Legal Aid for Low- and Moderate-Income
Americans, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 8–11 (June 2011), available at http://www.
americanprogress.org/issues/2011/06/pdf/evidence.pdf (recommending the use of an
evidence-based system).
185. See Mark Walsh, supra note 15 (explaining that those who are family law courts
on a regular basis may be able to provide useful insight that the Court is not privy to).
186. Joy Moses, Grounds for Objection: Causes and Consequences of America’s Pro
Se Crisis and How to Solve the Problem of Unrepresented Litigants, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS 11 (June 2011), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/
06/pdf/objection.pdf.
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public initiatives and to chart future directions. Law is no exception.”187
Other scholars agree.188
VII. Proposed Alternative Solutions
A. Establishing More New Law
If the Court could have a do-over, though, there certainly are some
alternatives that it could consider.189 First, the Court could read its
precedent as guidance and allow the states to create their own solutions.190
In Younger v. Harris,191 among other cases, the Court has expressed this
idea of comity and federalism, saying that there should be:
[A] proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the
entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and
a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if
the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate
functions in their separate ways.192

This is what states do best, acting as diverse laboratories for the crises of
their citizens.193 Understandably, such a comity may not work in all areas of
187. Louis S. Rulli, Money Well Spent: The Value of Civil Legal Assistance to the Poor,
75 PHILA. LAW. 24, 25 (2012), available at http://www.philadelphiabar.org/Web
Objects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/CMSResources/TPL_mag_Fall
12_probono.pdf.
188. See Alan Houseman, The Justice Gap: Civil Legal Assistance Today and
Tomorrow, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 12 (June 2011), available at http://www.
americanprogress.org/issues/2011/06/pdf/justice.pdf (“We need better ways to ensure legal
aid programs use tested performance measures and engage in ongoing evaluation. We must
also encourage funders to conduct evaluations for quality and effectiveness.”).
189. See Houseman, supra note 188, at 10–15 (showing alternative legal service
delivery options that states either have already implemented or that the author believes the
states should adopt).
190. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31–32 (1981) (leaving up to the
lower courts the decision of how much procedure will be is due in the type of case before the
Court).
191. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that a federal court cannot
enjoin enforcement of a state statute just because that statute, on its face, abridges First
Amendment rights).
192. Id. at 44.
193. See Michael S. Greve, Laboratories of Democracy: Anatomy of a Metaphor, 6
AM. ENTER. INST. 1 (May 2011), http://www.aei.org/files/2001/03/31/Laboratories%20of
%20Democracy%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Metaphor.pdf (“It is one of the happy
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the law, but this is one where it probably would—states were already
coming up with innovative solutions when they were left to their own
devices before Turner.194 In fact, before the decision was handed down in
June 2011, a majority of states had already come up with ways to provide
counsel in situations where the child support contemnor was facing jail
time.195 California, among other states, had tried a pilot program to test the
feasibility of providing counsel to its Turners.196 Twenty-four states and the
District of Columbia had all established their own access-to-justice
commissions, and while these were not specifically focused on child
support contemnors, they nevertheless innovated solutions that would help
someone like Turner get a fair determination.197 The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania also had heartily taken on the issue, creating “IOLTA
programs, filing fee surcharges, cy pres awards, and pro hac vice and
attorney registration fees,” while also improving the commonwealth’s legal
service delivery systems.198 Many of these options seem worthy of further
explanation.199 Additionally, states may have solutions that they have not
yet developed.200 For example, New York has recently made fifty hours of
pro bono service a prerequisite to sitting for its bar.201 This state could
incidents of the federal system,’ Justice Louis D. Brandeis wrote in 1932, ‘that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’”).
194. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Civil Gideon in Deadbeat Dad Cases Would be
‘Massive’ Change, Lawyer Tells Justices, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 24, 2011, 9:12 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/civil_gideon_in_deadbeat_dad_cases_would_be_m
assive_change_lawyer_tells_jus/ (noting that a majority of states had some sort of civil
Gideon assistance program in place).
195. See id. (explaining that many states already had some sort of assistance available
before the Turner decision).
196. See Siskind, supra note 159 (mentioning the system California has tested).
197. See Houseman, supra note 188, at 7 (relating the many civil legal aid programs in
place, and how technology and partnerships can be utilized successfully to protect the civil
rights of the litigants).
198. See Rulli, supra note 187, at 25 (describing Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court as a
leader in “expanding access to justice”).
199. See Houseman, supra note 188, at 6–7 (exploring different, feasible options that
can be used to protect the civil rights of the child support contemnor).
200. See id. at 7–9 (explaining different financial and political barriers to full program
implementation).
201. See Mosi Secret, Judge Details a Rule Requiring Pro Bono Work by Aspiring
Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012
/09/20/nyregion/pro-bono-work-becomes-a-requirement-to-practice-law-in-new-york.html?
_r=0 (detailing this new requirement for practicing law in New York).
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recommend or direct these applicants to assist in child support contempt
proceedings, thus alleviating at least part of “the justice gap.”202
If the federal government is worried about taking a complete hands-off
approach, there are still ways that it could be involved in protecting due
process.203 For example, the federal government could act as an analytical
and statistical supervisor, measuring the efficacy of these programs.204
Alternatively, one scholar has suggested that the federal government
support states by forming an umbrella group for organization or by issuing
a bond-type program for financial assistance.205
Although America’s legal system is unique in some regards, the
government can still survey the due process systems of other countries.206
For example, Korea, similar to New York, has a high amount of pro se
litigants; in Korea, more than eighty percent of the litigants are pro se,
while ninety-nine percent of the defendants in New York City are pro se.207
Yet, Korean judges take on a different role than American judges, in that
they combine informal and formal proceedings through which most parties
seem to reach informed and satisfactory solutions.208 Moreover, The
European Convention on Human Rights includes a provision about
providing civil Gideon and, as a result, several countries have set up
programs to comply.209 While, because of the different legal and taxing
202. See id. (showing one option to satisfy the 50 hour requirement is to perform pro
bono work for the poor).
203. See Houseman, supra note 188, at 12 (advocating for a system where the Legal
Services Corporation, the Justice Department, and state access-to-justice commissions work
together).
204. See Selbin et al., supra note 184, at 6 (“Regrettably, the federal government has
made little effort to capture information about legal aid funding sources, service provision,
and delivery outcomes. Insufficient data makes it hard to know how and where to spend the
limited money available to get the best results for low and moderate-income Americans.”).
205. See Selbin et al., supra note 184, at 11 (“The president’s FY 2012 budget includes
$100 million in social impact bonds to spur private investment in social interventions with
the potential to serve public purposes and save public resources.”).
206. See Barton et al., supra note 167, at 989–90 (pointing out that the federal
government can look to see how different countries’ court systems work).
207. JAMES R. MAXEINER, FAILURES OF AMERICAN CIVIL JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE xiv (2011).
208. See id. (referencing several successful alternative systems that American states and
cities may want to examine when determining how to best provide legal protections).
209. See Anna Richey Allan, Passport for Civil Gideon: European Perspectives on the
Civil Right to Counsel, LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 19–22 available at
http://www.lsej.org/documents/472851Passport%20for%20Civil%20Gideon%20-%20Allen
.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2013) (discussing various different ways that the right to counsel

204

20 WASH. & LEE J.CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 175 (2013)

systems, such a program might be more feasible in Europe, it is worth
investigating the success of protections implemented abroad.210 If the
United States federal government adopts the suggestion to take on a more
research-related role, perhaps helping to pilot programs and to measure
overall effectiveness of state efforts, the federal government could also look
to the civil legal aid systems in Europe and Canada for guidance.211
B. Achieving Reform through Current Law
Another suggestion is to accomplish civil Gideon through existing
law.212 For example, one unique suggestion by right to counsel advocates is
to use the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act for
this end.213 “Using the ADA to argue for free legal representation as a
courthouse accommodation for certain disabled individuals is both more
restrictive and yet broader than arguing for a full civil Gideon . . . . ADA
affords a broader remedy because its provisions are not ‘needs based’; that
is, ADA accommodations are available to rich and poor alike . . . .”214
Additionally, many defendants in child support contempt proceedings
appear to be “individual[s] with a disability” and thus qualified for ADA
protection.215

in civil proceedings is handled in other countries).
210. See id. (showing that the legal systems in other countries are organized in a
different way than the American legal system).
211. See Houseman, supra note 188, at 14–15 (commenting on the ways that other
countries’ governments have handled civil Gideon).
212. See Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What
Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 72–
73 (2009), available at http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2321&
context=ulj (assessing the impact of assistance programs already working within the current
law).
213. See Lisa Brodoff, Susan McClellan, & Elizabeth Anderson, The ADA: One Avenue
to Appointed Counsel Before a Full Civil Gideon, 2 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 609, 611
(2004), available at http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=14
59&context=sjsj (examining one innovative way to use the Americans with Disabilities Act,
within the bounds of the law, to further other civil rights concerns).
214. Id. at 611–12.
215. See id. at 616 (“A ‘person with a disability’ is defined as someone [with] . . . ‘(A)
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment.’”).
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Such a notion is compelling and will hopefully be tested.216 At the
same time, such a concept may be too idealistic because only those familiar
with the law would attempt to use the ADA to provide counsel to pro se
indigent litigants, and if indigents in need of help already have such legal
advice, then they probably would not need to use the ADA.217 The concept
is a way of rerouting the current system because, as it stands, indigents are
not always capable of forming sound legal arguments.218 Increasing the
legal knowledge required to figure out how to qualify for assistance could
complicate representation rather than ease it.219
States could also work within the existing legal system—they could
look into an alternative dispute resolution system; a more expanded type of
small claims court, where lawyers are not allowed on either side;220 or a
more specialized court, like a tax court, where the judges are better trained
to determine whether the contemnor is able to pay.221 Instead of lawyers, it
may be more beneficial to have someone similar to a bankruptcy referee, or
perhaps the states can allow nonlawyers and paralegals to represent litigants
in cases like Turner v. Rogers.222 A Center for American Progress work
group recently published other alternatives in a truly weighty list: clerks’
offices can become more supportive; courts can provide multilingual pro se
fact sheets; states can require allocution hearings; courts can simplify forms
216. See id. at 629 (explaining that the ADA is fully supported by state and federal law,
and that the costs of expanding such a program are minimal when compared with the loss of
housing, food, and other essentials that the litigants bear in order to enforce their civil
rights).
217. See id. at 619–20 (explaining, for a different reason, that even with some forms of
simplified pro se, the litigants are still unlikely to understand underlying legal issues;
seemingly, it would also be hard for the litigants to understand the rights and exceptions in
each ADA title).
218. See Brief in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 27, at 15 (“Civil contempt
proceedings can be extremely complex and often require skills and expertise beyond the
capacity of those too poor to retain counsel.”).
219. See Brief in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 27, at 15 (explaining that current
litigants are already overwhelmed by the legal requirements necessary to make their cases).
220. See Siskind, supra note 159 (proffering some legal structures used in different
types of claims).
221. See Brief in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 27, at 16 (explaining that other
determinations that family law judges have to make, such as whether or not a party is
indigent, are straightforward compared to deciding whether a party has an inability-to-pay).
222. See Richard Zorza, Turner v. Rogers: The Implications for Access to Justice
Strategies, 95 JUDICATURE 255, 262 (2012), available at http://www.zorza.net/AJSTurner.pdf (suggesting alternative structures other than two pro se parties before a judge).
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and place them online; judges and clerks can enter training programs; and
they can pay more attention to the all-important settlement stage in these
proceedings.223 In addition, there are legal procedures on the outskirts of
American law that may be worth closer examination.224 For example, states
can examine unbundling of lawyer services for these matters.225
Alternatively, states can “increase opportunities for nonprevailing parties to
recover attorney fees, so that deserving indigent parties will have a greater
chance of attracting private counsel.”226
Solutions are certainly already out there.227 If Turner had not been
decided in such a broad stroke, perhaps the states would be better able to
implement some of these solutions instead of being restricted by the new,
unsupported, but nonetheless mandated procedures.228 Regardless, states
are not restrained from implementing alternative nonconflicting safeguards
in addition to those proscribed in Turner, and perhaps they will.229
Finally, judges can also take on a more active reformative role.230
Richard Zorza, a pro se expert, has suggested that judges invest in judicial
education curriculum, instructional videos, and other best practices.231 Yet,
223. See Peter Edelman, When Second Best Is the Best We Can Do: Improving the
Odds for Pro Se Civil Litigants, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 8 (June 2011), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/06/pdf/secondbest.pdf
(highlighting a myriad of possible alternatives and additions to the current child support
contempt proceeding).
224. See id. at 5–8 (naming some alternatives that governments may not have yet tried
for securing better procedural due process).
225. See id. at 5 (“By way of temporary appearances, unbundling can avail pro se
defendants of legal defenses they didn’t know they had. But unbundling is no panacea. It’s
risky for lawyers to take on a limited representation role on short notice.”).
226. Siskind, supra note 159.
227. See Edelman, supra note 223, at 8–9 (referencing several viable options for
altering the legal assistance available to parties in a contempt proceeding).
228. See Houseman, supra note 188, at 10–13 (explaining that there is a lack of
resources and funding, which means that funds attributed to complying with Turner cannot
then be used for instituting innovative and successfully vetted alternatives).
229. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011) (explaining that the four
procedural safeguards are not the only alternatives suggested by the federal government).
230. See Zorza, supra note 222, at 259–62 (indicating that the court can take a more
active role in moving cases forward).
231. See Richard Zorza, Courts in the 21st Century: The Access to Justice
Transformation, 49 JUDGES’ J. 1, 4–7 (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_atj_judges_journal
_wi10.authcheckdam.pdf (suggesting ways in which the courts can take a more active role in
ensuring civil rights are protected through procedural due process).
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this may inherently present a “preaching to the choir” problem, where those
judges who are actively seeking the best practices probably already ensure
that no one in their court is unjustly confined, while those judges who
overlook procedure are unlikely to go out of their way to learn how to
correctly apply more of it.232 Still, the suggestions remain helpful in that
they highlight that both counsel and judges matter.233 Zorza’s solutions are
viable, well-thought out, and capable of safeguarding due process.234
C. True Cost-Benefit Analysis
While this may seem like the author is setting up a lengthy to-do list
for the states, this Note can fortunately end on a positive note. Spending on
any of these procedural safeguards will not go to waste and will not only
benefit the indigents.235 It has now repeatedly been shown that funding
legal aid has a positive economic impact on the state as a whole.236 The
Pennsylvania Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts (IOLTA) program, which
is tasked with managing civil legal aid, just released a study which revealed
that, for every dollar spent on legal aid, “$11 of quantifiable economic
outcomes and savings were realized for all residents of the
Commonwealth.”237 From the $53.6 million that was spent on the civil
services programs in 2011, the State reaped $594 million in income and
savings for Pennsylvanians, which in turn, supported 2,643 jobs for
Pennsylvania workers.238
This is not an anomaly.239 In 2009, Texas reported that for each dollar
spent on providing indigent civil legal services, “the Texas economy gained
232. See id. at 5–6 (illustrating that these suggestions will be helpful only to the judges
who take the time to read and institute them).
233. See id. (indicating that justices who take a more active role in the process can lead
to a better and more efficient solution).
234. See id. (providing a detailed, workable, and comprehensive outline of several
possible ways in which courts can take a more active role).
235. See Rulli, supra note 187, at 25–28 (indicating quantitatively the positive societal
impacts that result when a government spends money on civil legal assistance for its indigent
citizens).
236. See id. (citing numerous state studies indicating that provision of legal has a
positive economic effect).
237. Rulli, supra note 187, at 25.
238. Rulli, supra note 187, at 27.
239. See Rulli, supra note 187, at 27–28 (revealing that the results of the Pennsylvania
IOLTA program do not stand alone).
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$7.42 in total spending, $3.56 in gross output and $2.20 in personal
income.”240 Massachusetts recently affirmed that after spending $9.5
million on legal aid, the state benefited to the tune of $53.2 million.241 In
2010, the Florida Bar Foundation established that civil legal assistance
created “more than 3,300 jobs, producing $250 million of output in the state
economy and providing $297 million of disposable income.242 The Florida
study concluded that for every dollar spent on legal aid, the state received
an economic impact of $4.78.”243 In 2011, once again the nexus was
affirmed, when New York found that such spending stirred $980 million in
the overall economy, which, based on the state’s funding of the programs,
created an almost five-to-one return for every dollar spent.244
A University of Pennsylvania Law School professor who helped bring
these studies to light, Louis S. Rulli, established his own caveat about
them—it is possible that they overstate the economic impact of legal aid
spending.245 Still, this stipulation seems to be added only to err on the side
of a conservative reading of these studies because, in truth, the studies may
instead be underevaluating state cost savings.246 Regardless, there is a clear
economic benefit even if the numbers are not entirely accurate, and,
additionally, Rulli mentions that such spending adds unquantifiable value:
improving the poor’s view of the justice system and increasing the
effectiveness of justice, respect, and fairness overall.247 One can argue that
preventing unjust incarceration is priceless, and that the government must
try to reformat all future Turner v. Rogers litigations regardless of cost.248
These studies indicate that such an argument need not be made.249 It truly
240. Rulli, supra note 187, at 27.
241. Rulli, supra note 187, at 27.
242. Rulli, supra note 187, at 27.
243. Rulli, supra note 187, at 27.
244. Rulli, supra note 187, at 27.
245. See Rulli, supra note 187, at 27 (claiming that the economic impact studies are not
yet perfected; these are only preliminary reports).
246. See Rulli, supra note 187, at 27 (countering that there may actually be some
unrealized cost savings not yet taken into consideration).
247. See Rulli, supra note 187, at 28 (“Financial benefits are certainly gained in each of
these legal aid practice areas but, more importantly, vital interests are advanced that define
the type of society we value.”).
248. See Rulli, supra note 187, at 28 (“In the final analysis, the relationship between
ordinary citizens and their government is much more important to the long-term success of
our democracy than any short-term economic gains.”).
249. See Rulli, supra note 187, at 25–27 (providing consistent, independent studies
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appears that reform will never be too expensive if the state can turn a profit
five-fold—increasing access will just be seen as a wise investment.250
Fortunately, then, even if Turner does not gets overturned in the near
future, once states have a chance to examine such findings, they may feel
confident to enact more significant, meaningful reform withal.251
VIII. Life After Turner
The Circuit Courts appear to be citing Turner favorably.252 It is
interesting to note, however, that at least one judge believes that the Turner
outcome is dependent on the civil and criminal distinction.253 This is
interesting because Justice Breyer did not explicitly state this as the main
basis for the majority’s decision, but it appears that courts dabbling with
civil Gideon may use this distinction as a takeaway from Turner
nonetheless.254 Such a view also lends credibility to the above argument
that Gompers was worth a closer examination by the justices.255
Regardless, this interpretation of Turner should not be used because as
stated by the lower court judges above in Pasqua and Krieger, such focus
misses the point that counsel in the contempt setting seems dependent on
the possibility of incarceration instead.256
confirming that the government, and society generally, economically benefit from providing
legal services such as additional procedural protections for civil rights cases).
250. See Rulli, supra note 187, at 28 (explaining that providing citizens with legal help
and protection is fundamentally important for furthering society’s values, and citizens’ trust
in those values).
251. See Rulli, supra note 187, at 28 (explaining that in Pennsylvania, for example, the
studies will convince others that “legal aid to the poor helps everyone’s pocketbook and that
underfunding does economic harm to all Pennsylvanians”).
252. See, e.g., Clauson v. City of Springfield, 848 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D. Mass. 2012);
Cantey v. City of New York, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182323 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Eichwedel v.
Curry, 700 F.3d 275 (7th Cir. 2012) (showing a preview of cases which have followed the
holding).
253. See Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1209 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Turner in a
habeas corpus death penalty case).
254. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2512–20 (2011) (revealing that Justice
Breyer did not spend any significant discussion on this distinction).
255. See supra notes 98–117 and accompanying text (arguing that Gompers was
misread by the Supreme Court, as a case is to considered civil contempt only when the
contemnor has the present possibility to comply with the court’s orders).
256. See supra notes 124–28, 145–47 and accompanying text (utilizing past civil
Gideon case law that uses Gompers as a backdrop, but moves past it with focusing on
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In regards to the four mandated procedural safeguards, it is
disconcertingly unclear how effective they will be.257 The Brennan Center
for Justice’s amicus curiae brief includes a sobering revelation about how
very frequently parents who truly cannot pay child support are jailed in
Georgia.258 Unjust incarceration is a serious, reoccurring event, and the
solution to it should not just be decided on a whim, hope, or prayer of the
Court that it will work out.259 It is seemingly unlikely that the Court’s
safeguards will add any meaningful due process protection.260 In Turner
and other child support contempt cases, procedure was already in place.261
It was just that some judges, like the one who Turner was before, simply
decided not to abide by it.262 The four procedures will not now provide a
meaningful additional layer of protection for Turner had they been
mandated by the Supreme Court before 2006.263
There are some who are more optimistic about the benefits of the
decision, although they are still often guarded.264 One writer, pondering in
incarceration as the determinate for whether a litigant gets additional due process
procedure).
257. See Rebekah Diller, Turner v. Rogers: What the Court Did and Didn’t Say, AM.
CONST. SOC’Y BLOG (June 21, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/turner-v-rogers-whatthe-court-did-and-didn’t-say (concluding that it is still too uncertain to decide how Turner v.
Rogers will be implemented as there are some practical limitations).
258. See Brief of Nat’l Assoc. of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. at 16, Turner v.
Roger, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10).
259. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2524 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(expressing disapproval with the Court’s acceptance of one amicus brief as the solution to
what due process should be constitutionally afforded to child support contemnors, saying
that there are multiple reasons why the Supreme Court should not decide issues this way).
260. See In Rejecting “Civil Gideon” in Child Support Case, Supreme Court Implicitly
Raises Questions About the Value of a Lawyer, SBM BLOG (June 20, 2011),
http://sbmblog.typepad.com/sbm-blog/2011/06/us-supreme-court-rejects-civil-gideon-inchild-support-case.html (warning that there are many obstacles to the litigants still
“accessing the court system”).
261. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2509, 2518 (indicating that Turner’s judge was supposed
to find an inability to pay on the contempt court form, although he failed to do so, and later
referencing McBride v. McBride to say that such failed findings are common in the state).
262. See id. (relating that Turner’s judge, and many other judges in the state, do not ask
the questions required on the court contempt forms).
263. See Walsh, supra note 15 (citing one lawyer as saying that the safeguards are not
realistic, and citing another as saying that the Court’s decision here shows that they do not
understand how the child contempt system truly functions).
264. See Walsh, supra note 15 (citing one lawyer as saying “This decision is
progress. . . . It’s not 100 percent, but it’s certainly a strong step forward, and it will help the
states to have this decision”).
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an ABA Journal article, reflected, “In the long run, the impact of the
decision will be less about its language and more about its application at the
state and local level. It’s possible the world could be a better place in five
to 10 years because of this decision.”265 A lawyer in Michigan concurred
that the requirements could bring good change, but then admonished, “but
this could all be a farce.”266 Rebekah Diller, Deputy Director of the Justice
Program at the Brennan Center for Justice, presents a more realistic review
of the Court’s new mandates, commenting that they create a “thorny set of
implementation questions for the lower courts,” and while the procedures
“may well provide sufficient safeguards in a select number of cases,” they
are not “self-executing” and with a system already overworked and under
supervised, these may truly not help the unrepresented at all.267
Even though spectators seem less optimistic than the Turner majority
was that the procedures are a panacea, hopefully the safeguards will provide
some extra protection for child custody contemnors.268 Still, it would not be
a good idea to rely on such to-date unfounded hope.269 As discussed by the
majority in Pasqua v. Council, and by the dissent in Krieger v.
Commonwealth, the nature of the contempt proceeding is more complicated
than it may seem to be by an onlooker, and the safeguards have not altered
any fundamental part of the proceeding.270 Thus, many of the same
problems may assuredly arise, and at the end of the day few feel that
fundamental justice is now assured.271

265. Walsh, supra note 15.
266. In Rejecting “Civil Gideon” in Child Support Case, supra note 260.
267. Diller, supra note 257.
268. See Diller, supra note 257 (reflecting general sentiment that the Turner procedural
safeguards may not work the way that the Court is supposing that they will).
269. See Diller, supra note 257 (explaining that the Court’s analysis and solutions may
not work for more complicated factual situations that the Court did not mention).
270. See Krieger v. Commonwealth, 567 S.E.2d 557, 570 (Va. Ct. App. 2002)
(Annuziata, J., dissenting); Pasqua v. Council, 892 A.2d. 663 (N.J. 2006) (relating the grim
reality that the risk of error is so high in these types of cases that it cannot be assured that a
litigant can handle his case pro se).
271. See Diller, supra note 257 (“With scant checks on the system, it is hard to take
comfort in the procedural changes mandated by the Supreme Court. They will only work if
state courts—already struggling with budget cuts and rising caseloads—find time to take
extra care in their dealings with those who are unrepresented.”).
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IV. Conclusion

Perhaps because of the narrow holding, the case of Turner v. Rogers
was never given significant attention outside of the legal community. Yet,
as one can see from the state of pro se representation, criminal Gideon, and
current procedural safeguards as a result of it, the case truly is newsworthy.
Although the holding is explicitly narrow, the case sets strong
precedent in the opposite direction of prior civil Gideon case law. Justice
Breyer’s reasoning seems built on the distinction between criminal and civil
contempt, despite the Supreme Court having previously said that the focus
should instead be on what procedure is required for “fundamental fairness”
to be ensured. This faked ignorance of prior applications of law and
jurisprudence, along with the majority’s silence on the practicality of civil
Gideon, is relevant because although it was never admitted, the Turner v.
Rogers decision may have been one that was based less on a due process
concerns and instead was a forced finding to maintain the viability of the
American legal justice system.
Despite the limited holding, the Court engaged in discussion beyond
the issue raised by the parties and mandated safeguards to the states, which
are too unclear to be helpful or meaningful. Instead of considering expert
opinion about which due process protections would be most effective, the
Court simply adopted the only suggestion available. Such a decisionmaking process in any context is worrisome. It is still too early to tell how
the lower courts will use these mandated safeguards to change the legal
protections available to litigants like Turner, but even a survey in the past
year has not clarified how these procedures will add any more
constitutional protection to child support contempt cases. Fortunately, there
is a wealth of other options available to states, and additionally, it appears
that states will financially benefit from investing in such protections.
Therefore, while the Supreme Court’s decision in Turner may not have the
best answer to legal sagas that countless Americans face every day, the
decision is best seen not as a roadblock or a conclusion to these stories, but
rather one that can inspire fresh discussion and action for “fundamental
justice” nonetheless.

